

Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung

The MSC Flaminia

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MSC Flaminia, 85823 DWT, 6750 TEU, 299 x 40 m built by Daewoo in 2001

German flag; German ship owner; German ship management Cargo manager / charterer: MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co.

On route July 2012: crew of 23 + 2 passengers + 2876 containers Houston – Charleston – Antwerp - Bremerhaven





14 July 2012

Assumption according to the official German Investigation Report: Exothermic reaction in 2 tanks with a stabilized chemical mixture, resulting fire with 2 explosions injuring several members of the crew **Ca. 900 nm from Brest (France) / Falmouth (UK)** Photograph taken on 14 July 2012 from tanker DS Crown



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17 - 21 July 2012

Crew and passengers off board;

Status of crew: 1 dead, 1 missing, 1 heavily injured, 4 injured Arrival of 3 salvage tugs on 17, 19 and 21 July

Photograph taken on 17 July 2012 by Smit Salvage from Fairmount Expedition





18 – 24 July 2012

Fire fighting / cooling of ship and cargo from tugs

First boarding of rescue team on 20 July, fire fighting on board, MSC Flaminia is taken in tow



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25 – 27 July 2012

Fire fighting on board

Towing towards British Islands / France

Severe list (later up to 10°), draft increasing (later up to 19 m)





30 July - 5 August 2012

No fire fighting on board, stormy weather (in total for 13 days)

On 31 July: Activation of MAR-ICE (Marine Intervention in Chemical Emergencies Network) including CEDRE





6 – 17 August 2012

Fire fighting on board, smouldering fire in open holds Strategic discussions on salvage strategy intensified with competent authorities including UK, NL, France, Belgium, Germany

18 - 19 August 2012

Towing towards Land's End (UK)





20 August 2012

Responsibility of Flag State declared (first offer from 15 August)

Central Command for Maritime Emergencies Germany (CCME): Start of work for the MSC Flaminia incident








21 - 31 August 2012













Duties (at BfR)



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Press briefings via CCME Answering requests on cargo for CCME

Open communication with environmental NGO's (9-13 hrs/5)

Consulting ("help desk") for CCME (24 hrs/7)

Lead management for consultation with experts of the *Independent Group of Environmental Experts* to optimise scientific information



Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit

Independent Group of Scientists (UEG)

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Duties (at BfR)



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Plausibility check of industry data (MSDS) and cargo manifest for dangerous goods' containers

Prepare "Civil Protection" und "Occupational Safety" guidance

Information on health protection in case of direct contact:

- health hazards
- first aid advice




UK experience from MSC Napoli incident 2007








2876 Containers / 153 Dangerous Goods Containers **Stowage, fate and hazards of cargo transport units**







2876 Containers / 153 Dangerous Goods Containers **Stowage, fate and hazards of cargo transport units**





Overview on dangerous goods data

1. Compilation of available documents

- (1) Cargo Manifest
- (2) Dangerous Goods Declarations
- (3) information communicated by consignors

2. Identification of hazards of goods loaded inside containers

Safety Data Sheets compiled by chemical industry fire brigades (BASF SE & Dow Chemical) via TUIS (Transport-Accident-Information and Technical-Support-System is "national ICE")

3. Connecting information from salvage master

to individual containers with above mentioned information

- about 72 destroyed or lost
- about 24 damaged or effected by fire
- about 55 in principle intact



Objectives for the risk assessment approach

- Identification of those hazards which are specific to the MSC Flaminia incident "specific hazards" are those not common to all vessels under distress (e.g. fuel oil)
- 2. Hazard evaluation with the **emphasis on precautionary measures** during emergency operations either on board, on sea, on beach or during site cleaning
- 3. No **comprehensive risk assessment** (hazard x probability) the stability of the vessel was of highest importance and the probability of total loss was not calculable





Fire fighting water

Independent Group of Scientists (UEG)

Suspicion:

Strong contamination by chemicals from leaking dangerous goods cargo

Evaluation:

Because of the large volume (first estimate: 20,000 tonnes) even "slight" contamination could create hazards to the marine environment

Chemical analysis and biological testing:

after evaluation of the situation by UEG scientists ecotoxicological testing was recommended (supported by scientific literature)






Ecotoxicity tests

(performed at Federal Institute of Hydrology, BfG)



- 1. Luminescent bacteria test with (Alii)vibrio fischeri
- 2. Growth inhibition test with the green algae Desmodesmus subspicatus
- 3. Growth inhibition test with the marine algae Phaeodactylum tricornutum
- 4. Acute immobilisation test with Daphnia magna
- 5. Artemia test with Artemia franciscana
- 6. Yeast Estrogen Screen (YES) with S. cerevisiae (endocrine)
- 7. Yeast Androgen Screen (YAS) with S. cerevisiae (endocrine)
- 8. Ames fluctuation test with Salmonella typhimurium (mutagen.)





- (1) Acute aquatic toxicity EC₅₀ ranging <u>> 6700 mg/L</u>; marine algae as most sensitive organism
- (2) Potential risk for the marine ecosystem: when diluting by factor 2000 no direct adverse effects assumed; slight endocrine activity and mutagenic potential
- (3) Fire fighting hazard class "alarming" to "critical": no direct discharge into sewage systems / environment



Conclusions / challenges / perspectives from an environment / health risk assessment standpoint

- 1 "Small volume" (%) of dangerous goods / time for assessment: Evaluation of hazard information in a shorter time period ?
- Only 3000 containers (7000 TEU) involved (medium sized vessel):
 Risk assessment for large container vessels (>14000 TEU) ?
- 3 The Dangerous Goods classification is limited to specific criteria: Non-classified containers are creating a risk to the environment?



Conclusions / challenges / perspectives from an environment / health risk assessment standpoint

4 Material safety data for chemical mixtures / articles on board: Information for specific product composition from consignors ?

- 5 Toxic effects from fire fighting water on the environment: Testing and for risk assessment guidance (European acceptance) ?
- 6 Container vessels in emergency at European coasts: European co-operation for common risk assessment / data exchange ?



First report in French:

Feu à bord du MSC Flaminia gestion par les autorités allemandes

Bulletin d'information du CEDRE nº 30 - juin 2013 (4 - 9)



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Official German report has just been published (www.bsu-bund.de)

Federal Bureau of Maritime Casuality Investigation (BSU): Investigation Report 255/12
Fire and explosion on board the MSC Flaminia on 14 July 2012 in the Atlantic and the ensuing events



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Thank you for your attention !

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